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Abstract 
We measure the size of the fiscal multiplier using a heterogeneous agents model with incomplete 
markets, capital and rigid prices and wages. This environment captures all elements that are 
considered essential for a quantitative analysis. First, output is (partially) demand determined due 
to pricing frictions in product and labor markets, so that a fiscal stimulus increases aggregate 
demand. Second, incomplete markets deliver a realistic distribution of the marginal propensity to 
consume across the population, whereas all households counterfactually behave according to the 
permanent income hypothesis if markets are complete. Here, poor households feature high MPCs 
and thus tend to spend a large fraction of the additional income that arises as a result of a fiscal 
stimulus, assigning a quantitatively important role to the standard textbook Keynesian cross logic. 
Interestingly, and unlike conventional wisdom would suggest, our dynamic forward looking model 
reinforces this channel significantly. Third, the model features a realistic wealth to income ratio 
since we allow two assets, government bonds and capital. We find that market incompleteness 
plays the key role in determining the size of the fiscal multiplier, which is about 1.5 if deficit 
financed and about 0.6 if tax financed. Surprisingly, the size of fiscal multiplier remains similar in 
the Great recession where the economy was in a liquidity trap. Finally, we elucidate the 
differences between our heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets model to those featuring 
complete markets or hand-to-mouth consumers. 
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1 Introduction
In an attempt to stabilize the economy during the Great Recession monetary authorities low-
ered nominal interest rates to nearly zero and fixed them at that level for a long time. Having
reached the limit of traditional monetary policy, U.S. legislators stepped in with the largest
fiscal stimulus since the 1930s. Almost a trillion dollars was to be spent by the government,
much of it early on, but also with significant spending budgeted to future years up to 2019.
Although attempts to stabilize the economy through fiscal spending occur in virtually
every recession, the questions of how much and through which channels an increase in govern-
ment spending affects output, employment and investment are classic, but the answers are far
from being settled. The traditional logic describing the effects of these policies is well known.
A government spending stimulus increases aggregate demand which leads to higher labor de-
mand and thus more employment and higher wages. Higher labor income then stimulates
consumption, in particular of poor households, which leads to even higher aggregate demand,
and thus higher employment, higher labor income, more consumption and so on. The equilib-
rium impact of an initial government spending of $1 on output - the fiscal multiplier - is then
the sum of the initial increase in government spending and the induced private consumption
response.
This simple argument is based on two essential elements which ensure that the stimulus has
a direct impact on output and employment as well as an indirect multiplier effect on private
consumption. The first element is that output is demand determined, which ensures that the
increase in government spending stimulates aggregate demand. The key underlying assumption
is that prices are rigid so that firms adjust quantities and not only prices as a response to more
government demand. Firms increase production to satisfy this demand by raising employment
and wages, which leads to higher household income. We name this demand and associated
output stimulus through an increase in government spending the direct effect. The direct
effect differs from the full equilibrium effect in that it keeps prices and taxes unchanged, and,
most importantly, does not take into account indirect multiplier effects which arise from higher
private consumption. The second element is a significant deviation from the permanent income
hypothesis, such that households have a high marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
the transitory increase in income induced by the stimulus, generating a nontrivial indirect
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effect. Higher private consumption due to the direct effect then leads to more labor demand,
higher labor income and again more consumption and so on.
While this simple argument may be appealing, a quantitative assessment of a stimulus
policy requires both elements to be disciplined by the empirical behavior of households and
firms to determine if either the direct or indirect effects are significant. This requires a model
that, first, features the right amount of nominal rigidities, so that the aggregate demand
channel is as in the data. And, second, it requires incorporating observed marginal propensities
to consume which imply a substantial deviation from the permanent income hypothesis.
In this paper we measure the size of the fiscal multiplier in a dynamic equilibrium model
featuring these two elements disciplined by micro behavior. Specifically, we extend the stan-
dard Bewley-Imrohoroglu-Huggett-Aiyagari model to include New-Keynesian style nominal
price and wage rigidities. Introducing incomplete markets allows the model to match the rich
joint distribution of income, earnings and wealth. Such heterogeneity is crucial in generating
a realistic distribution of MPCs and, more generally, for assessing the effects of policies that
induce redistribution. The nominal rigidities allow for the model to have a meaningful demand
channel operating.
Clearly, “the fiscal multiplier” is not a single number – its size crucially depends on how it
is financed (debt, distortionary taxation, reduction of transfers), how persistent fiscal policy
is, what households and firms expect about future policy changes, and whether spending is
increased or transfers are directed to low-income households. These important details can be
incorporated in the model but are difficult to control for in empirical studies. Perhaps it is
due to these difficulties that, despite the importance of this research question, no consensus
on the size of the multiplier has been reached and findings come with substantial uncertainty
(see Ramey (2011) for a survey).1 Of course, we are not the first to attempt to sidestep these
difficulties faced in empirical work by relying on a more theoretical approach. Instead, our
contribution is to assess the fiscal multiplier using a model that simultaneously features a
1Most of the empirical studies use aggregate data to measure the strength of the fiscal multiplier, which
range from around 0.6 to 1.8, although “reasonable people can argue, however, that the data do not reject
0.5 or 2.0” (see Ramey (2011)). Another more recent strand of the literature looks at cross-state evidence and
typically finds larger multipliers. However, as Ramey (2011) and Farhi and Werning (2013) have pointed out,
the size of the local multipliers found in those studies may not be very informative about the magnitude of
aggregate multipliers. For example, the local multiplier could be 1.5 whereas the aggregate multiplier is 0.
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demand channel and a realistic consumption response to changes in income.2
One strand of the existing literature assumes flexible prices and thus eliminates the demand
channel. An early example is Baxter and King (1993) who used a representative agent model.
Later contributions with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets include Heathcote
(2005) and Brinca et al. (2016). This framework is limited in its ability to provide a full
assessment as only the supply but not the demand channel is operative, that is the first
essential element is not present.
Another strand of the literature uses New Keynesian models with sticky prices and wages
to compute the fiscal multiplier. Nominal rigidities provide a role for the demand channel but
now the second essential element is missing because in existing models used for the analysis of
fiscal stimulus households are assumed to be representative agents. Such households behave
exactly like permanent-income ones and there is no heterogeneity in the marginal propensity
to consume. Further, the MPC in response to a temporary shock is small, which stands in
the face of the findings of a large empirical literature that has documented substantial MPC
heterogeneity and large consumption responses to transitory income and transfer payments.
More generally, the consumption block embedded in the Representative Agent New Keynesian
(RANK) model focuses on intertemporal substitution of consumption only, whereas the data
assign only a small role to such considerations (Kaplan and Violante (2014), Kaplan et al.
(2016)).
In our model the fiscal multiplier operates through two channel — intertemporal sub-
stitution and redistribution — with interesting interactions. The intertemporal substitution
channel describes how government spending changes real interest rates and how this changes
private consumption. The strength of this channels depends first on the magnitude of the re-
sponse of real interest rates and second on how this change in real interest rates affects private
consumption. The distributional channel describes the redistributional consequences changes
in prices, income, taxes etc. induced by government spending. The strength of this channel
depends on the magnitude of the changes in response to spending, and on how that redistribu-
2There is a growing literature which incorporates nominal rigidities into incomplete markets models, for
example Oh and Reis (2012), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015), Gornemann et al. (2012), Kaplan et al. (2016),
Auclert (2016) and Lu¨tticke (2015), McKay and Reis (2016), McKay et al. (2015), Bayer et al. (2015), Ravn
and Sterk (2013) and Den Haan et al. (2015), but we are not aware of any contribution in this literature which
considers fiscal multipliers.
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tion affect private consumption. Here it is important that the response of labor earnings is in
line with the data for at least two reasons. First, for asset poor workers income moves basically
one-to-one with earnings. Second, the profits of firms move roughly inversely with wages in
response to a demand stimulus. Introducing wage rigidities to match the empirical properties
of wages bounds the volatility of profits in the model, which is crucial for policy evaluation
as the distributional effects arising from the distribution of profits have first order implica-
tions. That is why we extend previous work on HANK-type models (that feature incomplete
markets and price rigidities, but flexible wages), and allow wages to be as rigid as observed
in the data. In addition, these two channels do not operate independently of each other in
general equilibrium, but may reinforce or attenuate each other as changes in real interest rate
have distributional effects, and redistribution itself affects the equilibrium real interest rate.
Panel a) of Figure 1 illustrates the two channels in incomplete markets. In contrast Panel b)
of Figure 1 shows the mechanism in complete markets. In this special but standard case only
the intertemporal channel is operative.
Depend on entire distribution 
and path of w, T, h
Fiscal Stimulus
Intertemporal Substitution
Redistribution Effects
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(a) Incomplete Markets
Fiscal Stimulus
Intertemporal Substitution
Redistribution Effects
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Figure 1: Channels of Fiscal Stimulus
Our paper is the first to quantify the size of those channels in a model where both are
present in a meaningful way and compare our results to the standard model with complete
markets. On the one hand, theoretical arguments3 show that the response of real interest
3Indeed, the theoretical findings in Hagedorn (2016) imply that the response of inflation and real interest
rates to changes in government spending are smaller in incomplete markets than in complete market models.
This is a consequence of the result that incomplete markets combined with fiscal policy specified partially in
nominal terms delivers a globally determined price level independently of how monetary policy is specified.
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rates is weaker in incomplete markets models than in complete market models, suggesting
that the multiplier is smaller here. And Kaplan et al. (2016) show that a given change in real
interest rate has smaller effects in incomplete market models than in complete market models.
Both arguments together - a smaller response and and a smaller effect of real interest rates -
imply that the intertemporal channel is weaker here than if markets were complete. On the
other hand, the redistributional channel is larger in incomplete market models (as it is absent
in complete markets), suggesting that the multiplier is larger here than in complete market
models.
We find that the impact multiplier of an increase in government spending is equal to
0.6 if spending is tax financed and 1.5 if it is deficit financed outside. We then apply our
model to assess the size of the fiscal multiplier in a liquidity trap, a question that has received
renewed interest in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We threfore engineer a liquidity trap
where the natural real interest rate falls below zero and is consistent with salient aggregate
dynamics during the Great Recession. The results from the benchmark analysis are relatively
little changed. The impact multiplier is now about 0.7 for tax financed and 1.5 for deficit
financed spending. Two stark differences to the complete market case require an explanation:
the size if the multiplier depends on how it is financed, and the multiplier is quite independent
from the state of the economy. The dependence on the type of financing and specifically deficit
spending being more effective in stimulating the economy than tax financing is not surprising
in models where Ricardian equivalence is violated. Increasing spending and taxes at the same
time first stimulates demand but then offsets it through raising taxes which also affects high
MPC households. In contrast with deficit financing, the newly issued debt is largely bought
by low MPC households whereas high MPC households largely consume additional income.
Deficit financing thus implicitly redistributes from asset-rich households with low MPC who
finance their consumption more from asset income to low-asset households with high MPC
who rely more on labor income so that the aggregate MPC increases.
The reason why we do not find big differences in and outside of a liquidity trap is that the
response of the real interest rate in our model is very similar in both scenarios whereas the
In a liquidity trap a large drop in prices on impact is ruled out as this would lead to a large increase in the
real value of government debt, which requires an increase in real interest rates (=further drop in prices) for
households to be willing to absorb the debt, and so on such that the real value of debt converges to infinity,
violating households transversality condition.
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response is much larger in a liquidity trap if markets are complete. As a result the magnitude
of the intertemporal channel is quite similar across scenarios in our model whereas it is much
larger in than outside a liquidity trap if markets are complete. Our preferred decomposition of
the strength of the two channels shows that the intertemporal channel contributes 0.95(0.95)
and the redistributional channel contributes 0.55(−0.35) to the multiplier of 1.5(0.6) if deficit
(tax) financed with a similar decomposition in a liquidity trap. We also find that the multiplier
in a liquidity trap gets smaller if prices become more flexible in contrast to the typical findings
in the New Keynesian literature. Our results also indicate some limits to scaling up the stimulus
since the multiplier is decreasing in the size of the spending stimulus.
The multiplier is high on impact but dies out quite quickly so that the cumulative mul-
tiplier, which is the discounted average multiplier over time, falls to 0.5 if spending is tax
financed and 1.2 if it is deficit financed. Considering the effect of a pre-announced anticipated
spending increase, we find this “forward-spending” to be less effective than an unexpected
stimulus. For example, the cumulative multiplier for spending pre-announced four quarters in
advance is 0.45 if it is tax financed and 1.3 if it is deficit financed. The main reason being that
firms raise prices immediately in anticipation of future higher demand which leads to output
losses before the actual policy is implemented.
The benchmark analysis isolates the effects of fiscal policy by assuming a nominal interest
fixed at zero. However, we corroborate our benchmark findings when we deviate from this
assumption and assume that monetary policy is described by an interest rate feedback rule
instead. This happens because prices do not move much. Firms anticipate correctly that the
long-run price level returns eventually to its pre-stimulus level which dampens the incentives
to increase prices. Together with strong price rigidities, this makes prices move only little so
that the interest rate feedback rule implies little movement in interest rates as well.
Incomplete markets models also allows us to conduct a meaningful analysis of transfer
multipliers, which is an important objective as many stimulus policies take the form of transfers
and not an increase in spending. We also use the theoretical model to compute the welfare
consequences of temporary increases in government spending and in transfer payments. This
exercise is more interesting than in a complete markets environment since the welfare gains
of high MPC households may outweigh the losses of low MPC (rich) households.
Finally, we compare our findings to those of a Two-Agent New Keynesian (TANK) model
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where one fraction of households is hand-to-mouth and the other fraction behaves according to
the permanent income hypothesis delivers a much smaller multiplier even for the same MPC
- relating current income to current consumption - as in our HANK model. The reason for
this stark difference is the different consumption response both to current and future income
increases in both models. Hand-to-mouth consumers spend the full increase in current income
but do not respond to increases in future income. In contrast the consumption response is less
extreme in our model. Households respond to both current and future income changes, albeit
the latter response is smaller. As a result the logic underlying the size of the multiplier is
dynamic. An increase in fiscal spending leads to higher income which leads to higher private
consumption demand not only today but also in all future periods. This higher path of private
spending leads to a higher income path which again increases spending in all periods. In
particular we find that today’s consumption responds mainly because future income increases
and not because of an increase in current income. Indeed the increase in private consumption
due to the increase in current income is similar to the small consumption increase in the
TANK model which is not surprising since both models feature the same impact MPC.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our incomplete markets model with
price and wage rigidities. In Section 3 we study the size of the government-spending multiplier
both for an interest rate peg and when monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule.
2 Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model with one important modification: Markets
are incomplete as in Aiyagari (1994, 1995) whereas they are complete in a standard New
Keynesian model. We add the standard features of new Keynesian models to an incomplete
markets model. Price setting faces some constraints as price adjustments are costly as in
Rotemberg (1982) leading to price rigidities. As is standard in the New Keynesian literature,
final output is produced in several intermediate steps. Final good producers combine the
intermediate goods to produce a competitive goods market. Intermediate goods producers
are monopolistically competitive. They set a price they charge to the final good producer to
maximize profits taking into account the price adjustment costs they face. The intermediate
goods producer buy the input, labor, in competitive markets. We also allow for sticky wages
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and assume that differentiated labor is monopolistically supplied as well.
2.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of agents normalized to measure 1 with CRRA prefer-
ences over consumption and additively separable preferences for leisure:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht)
where:
u(c, h) =

c1−σ−1
1−σ − g(h) if σ 6= 1
log(c)− g(h) if σ = 1,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and g(h) is the disutility of labor. Agents’ labor
productivity {st}∞t=0 is stochastic and is characterized by an N -state Markov chain that can
take on values st ∈ S = {s1, · · · , sN} with transition probability characterized by p(s′|s) and∫
s = 1. Agents rent their labor services, hs, to firms for a real wage wt and their nominal assets
a to the capital market for a nominal rent ia and a real return (1+ra) = 1+i
a
1+pi
, where 1+pi = P
′
P
is the inflation rate. The nominal return on bonds is i with a real return (1 + r) = 1+i
1+pi
. There
are two classes of assets, bonds and capital with potentially different returns, but households
can invest in one asset A, which the mutual fund (described below) collects and allocates to
bonds and capital.
To allow for sticky wages we follow the literature and assume that each household j provides
differentiated labor services, hjt. These differentiated labor services are transformed by a
representative, competitive labor packer firm into an aggregate effective labor input, Ht using
the following technologies:
Ht =
(∫ 1
0
sjt(hjt)
w−1
w dj
) w
w−1
, (1)
where w is the elasticity of substitution across labor services.
A middleman firm (e.g. a union) sells households labor services to the labor packer, which
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given aggregate labor demand H by the intermediate goods sector, minimizes costs∫ 1
0
Wjtsjthjtdj, (2)
implying a demand for the labor services of household j:
hjt = h(Wjt;Wt, Ht) =
(
Wjt
Wt
)−w
Ht, (3)
where Wt is the (equilibrium) nominal wage which can be expressed as
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
sjtW
1−w
jt dj
) 1
1−w
.
The middleman sets a nominal wage Wˆt for an effective unit of labor so that Wjt = Wˆt
to maximize profits subject to wage adjustment costs similar to the price adjustment costs as
in Rotemberg (1982). These adjustment costs are proportional to idiosyncratic productivity
s and are measured in units of aggregate output and are given by a quadratic function of the
change in wages above and beyond steady state wage inflation Π
w
,
Θ
(
sjt,Wjt = Wˆt,Wjt−1 = Wˆt−1;Yt
)
= sjt
θw
2
(
Wjt
Wjt−1
− Πw
)2
Ht = sjt
θw
2
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)2
Ht.
The middleman’s wage setting problem is to maximize4
V wt
(
Wˆt−1
)
≡ max
Wˆt
∫ (sjt(1− τt)Wˆt
Pt
h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht)− g(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht))
u′(Ct)
dj
−
∫
sjt
θw
2
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)2
Htdj +
1
1 + rt
V wt+1
(
Wˆt
)
, (4)
where Ct is aggregate consumption. Some algebra (delegated to the appendix) yields, using
hjt = Ht and Wˆt = Wt and defining the real wage wt =
Wt
Pt
, the wage inflation equation
θw
(
piwt − Πw
)
piwt = (1− τt)(1− w)wt + w
g′(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht))
u′(Ct)
+
1
1 + rt
θw
(
piwt+1 − Πw
)
piwt+1
Ht+1
Ht
.
(5)
4Equivalently one can think of a continuum of middlemen each setting the wage for a representative part
of the population with
∫
s = 1 at all times.
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The wage adjustment process does not involve actual costs but is as-if those costs were actually
present. We make this assumption to avoid significant movements of these adjustment costs in
response to a fiscal stimulus or in a liquidity trap. Such swings would matter in our incomplete
markets model and might yield quite different implications from price setting a` la Calvo.
Thus, at time t an agent faces the following budget constraint:
Ptct + at+1 = (1 + i
a
t )at + (1− τt)Ptwthtst + Tt
where τt is a proportional labor tax and Tt is a nominal lump sum transfer. Agents are price
takers. In addition households take wages and hours h from the middleman’s wage setting
problem as given. Thus, we can rewrite the agent’s problem recursively as follows:
V (a, s; Ω) = max
c≥0,a′≥0
u(c, l) + β
∑
s∈S
p(s′|s)V (a′, s′; Ω′) (6)
subj. to Pc+ a′ = (1 + ia)a+ P (1− τ)whs+ T
Ω′ = Γ(Ω)
where Ω(a, s) ∈M is the distribution on the space X = A×S, agents asset holdings a ∈ A and
labor endowment s ∈ S, across the population, which will together with the policy variables
determine the equilibrium prices. H is an equilibrium object that specifies the evolution of
the wealth distribution.
2.2 Production
Final Good Producer A competitive representative final goods producer aggregates a
continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and with prices pj:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
−1

jt dj
) 
−1
.
where  is the elasticity of substitution across goods. Given a level of aggregate demand Y ,
cost minimization for the final goods producer implies that the demand for the intermediate
good j is given by
yjt = y(pjt;Pt, Yt) =
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt, (7)
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where P is the (equilibrium) price of the final good and can be expressed as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−jt dj
) 1
1−
.
2.2.1 Intermediate-Goods Firms
A monopolist produces intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] using the following technology:
Yjt =
 ZtKαjtH1−αjt − ZtF if ≥ 00 otherwise , (8)
where 0 < α < 1, Kjt is capital services rented, Hjt is labor services rented and the fixed cost
of production are denoted F > 0.
Intermediate firms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive factor markets. Profits
are fully taxed by the government. A firm’s real marginal cost is mcjt = ∂St(Yjt)/∂Yjt, where
St(Yjt) = min
Kjt,Hjt
rktKjt + wtHjt, where Yjt is given by (8) (9)
Given our functional forms, we have
mct =
(
1
α
)α(
1
1− α
)1−α
(rkt )
α(wt)
1−α
Zt
(10)
and
Kjt
Hjt
=
αwt
(1− α)rkt
(11)
Prices are sticky as there are the same Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs as in the
simple model.
Given last period’s individual price pjt−1 and the aggregate state (Pt, Yt, Zt, wt, rt), the
firm chooses this period’s price pjt to maximize the present discounted value of future profits,
satisfying all demand. The firm’s pricing problem is
Vt (pjt−1) ≡ max
pjt
pjt
Pt
y (pjt;Pt, Yt)−S(y(pjt;Pt, Yt))−θ
2
(
pjt
pjt−1
− Π
)2
Yt−ZtΦ+ 1
1 + rt
Vt+1 (pjt) ,
where Φ are fixed operating costs.
The same algebra as in the appendix for the case with labor as the only input into pro-
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duction yields the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(1− ) + mct − θ
(
pit − Π
)
pit +
1
1 + rt
θ
(
pit+1 − Π
)
pit+1
Yt+1
Yt
= 0
The equilibrium real profit of each intermediate goods firm is then
dt = Yt − ZtF − S(Yt).
2.2.2 Mutual Fund
The mutual fund collects households savings At+1/Pt+1 and pays a real return r˜
a
t and invest
them in real bonds Bt+1/Pt+1 and capital Kt+1. It maximizes
Φ(Kt+2, Kt+1) + (1 + r
k
t+1 − δ)(Kt+1) + (1 + rt+1)Bt+1/Pt+1 − (1 + r˜at+1)(At+1/Pt+1),
sucht that At+1/Pt+1 = Kt+1+Bt+1/Pt+1+Φ(Kt+1, Kt) and for adjustment costs Φ(Kt+1, Kt),
taking Kt and Kt+2 as given. In equilibrium
rt+1 = r˜
a
t+1
1 + rkt+1 − δ = (1 + r˜at+1)(1 + Φ1(Kt+1, Kt))− Φ2(Kt+2, Kt+1)
At+1/Pt+1 = Kt+1 +Bt+1/Pt+1 + Φ(Kt+1, Kt).
The same first order conditions would arise in an intertemporal optimization problem where
profits are discounted at rate r˜a. The objective function above shows all parts of the full
intertemporal objective function where t+ 1 terms appear, evaluated in period t+ 1.
The total profits of the fund are
DMFt+1 = (1 + r
k
t+1 − δ)Kt+1 + (1 + rt+1)Bt+1/Pt+1 − (1 + r˜at+1)(At+1/Pt+1),
and per unit of investment are dMFt+1 = D
MF
t+1 /(At+1/Pt+1). Households therefore receive (or
have to pay) dt+1At+1/Pt+1 in period t + 1 per unit invested such that households’ return
equals
(1 + rat+1) = (1 + r˜
a
t+1 + d
MF
t+1 ).
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2.3 Government
The government obtains revenue from taxing labor income, issuing bonds and taxing profits at
100%. Household labor income wsl is taxed progressively with a nominal lump-sum transfer
Tt and a proportional tax τ :
T˜ (wsh) = −T + τPwsh.
The government issues nominal bonds denoted by Bg, with negative values denoting govern-
ment asset holdings and fully taxes profits away, obtaining nominal revenue Pd.
The government uses the revenue to finance exogenous nominal government expenditures,
Gt, interest payments on bonds and transfers to households.
The government budget constraint is therefore given by:
Bgt+1 = (1 + it)B
g
t +Gt − Ptdt −
∫
T˜t(wtstht)dΩ. (12)
2.4 Equilibrium
Market clearing requires that the labor demanded by the firm is equal to the aggregate labor
and that the bonds issued by the government and capital demand equals the amount of assets
provided by households:
Kt+1 +Bt+1/Pt+1 + Φ(Kt+1, Kt) = At+1/Pt+1 =
∫
at
∑
st∈S
at+1(at, st)dΩt(at, st) (13)
Ht =
∫
njtdj (14)
where we have abused notation slightly here, at+1(at, st) is the asset choice of an agent with
asset level at and period labor endowment st.
Definition: A monetary competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices Pt, tax rates
τt, nominal transfers Tt, nominal government spending Gt, bonds B
g
t , a value functions vt :
X × M → R with policy functions at : X × M → R+ and ct : X × M → R+, hours
Ht : A → R+, capital Kt : A → R+, pricing functions rt : A → R and wt : A → R+, and a
law of motion Γ : A→ A, such that:
1. vt satisfies the Bellman equation with corresponding policy functions at and ct given
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price sequences rt(), wt() and hours Ht.
2. Prices are set optimally by firms.
3. Wages are set optimally by middlemen.
4. The mutual fund maximizes profits taking prices as given.
5. For all Ω ∈M:
Kt+1 +Bt+1/Pt+1 + Φ(Kt+1, Kt) =
∫
at+1(a, s; Ωt)dΩt/Pt+1,
Ht(ΩT ) =
∫
njtdj,
Yt = ZtK
α
t H
1−α
t =
∫
c(a, s; Ω)dΩt +
G
P
+ F +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + Φ(Kt+1, Kt).
6. Aggregate law of motion Γ generated by a′ and p.
3 The Fiscal Multiplier
In this Section we calculate the fiscal multiplier in our model with incomplete markets, con-
ducting the following experiment. Assume that the economy is in steady state with nominal
bonds Bss, government spending Gss, transfers Tss and a tax rate τss and where the price
level is Pss. The real value of bonds is then Bss/Pss, the real value government expenditure is
Gss/Pss and so on. We then consider an M.I.T. (unexpected and never-again-occuring) shock
to government expenditures and compute the impulse response to this persistent innovation
in G. Eventually the economy will reach the new steady state characterized by government
bonds Bnewss = Bss, government spending G
new
ss = Gss, transfers T
new
ss = Tss and a tax rate
τnewss = τss the price level is P
new
ss .
3.1 The Fiscal Multiplier in Incomplete Market Models
In our model the fiscal multiplier operates through two channel — intertemporal substitution
and redistribution — with interesting interactions. The intertemporal substitution channel
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describes how government spending changes real interest rates and how this changes private
consumption. The distributional channel describes how government spending changes prices,
income, taxes etc., the redistributional consequences of these changes and the resulting impact
on private consumption. We now explain the role of these two channels in determining the
fiscal multiplier in our model, what determines their strength and explain the differences to
complete markets.
3.1.1 Intertemporal Substitution Channel
To understand the workings of the intertemporal substitution channel in our model it is
instructive to start with the complete markets case where this is the only channel operational.
We then move to incomplete markets to explain and understand the differences.
The size of the multiplier m is determined by the response of the real interest rates only.
The Consumption Euler equation for our utility function, C
1−σ
1−σ + ...
C−σt = β(1 + rt+1)C
−σ
t+1. (15)
Iterating this equation and assuming that consumption is back to the steady state level at
time T , CT = Css, we obtain for consumption at time t = 1 when spending is increased,
C−σ1 =
( T−1∏
t=1
(
β(1 + rt+1)
)
C−σT , (16)
so that the initial percentage increase in consumption and thus the fiscal multiplier equals
m =
C1
Css
=
( T−1∏
t=1
β(1 + rt+1)
)−1
σ
=
( T−1∏
t=1
1 + rt+1
1 + rss
)−1
σ
(17)
where we have used that β(1 + rss) = 1 in a complete markets steady state. As a result the
size of the fiscal multiplier is one-to-one related to the accumulated response of real interest
rate which is induced by the fiscal stimulus,
log(m) =
1
σ︸︷︷︸
Intertemporal Substitution
T−1∑
t=1
(log(1 + rss)− log(1 + rt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change of real interest rates
, (18)
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which can be decomposed in the change in the real interest rate, ≈ rt − rss, and the effect of
this change on consumption, whose strength is governed by the IES, 1
σ
. Both components of
the intertemporal substitution channel are weaker in incomplete market models. The effect of
the real interest rate on consumption is smaller since some households are credit constrained
and thus not on their Euler equation, breaking the tight link between consumption and real
interest rates. Also the change in real interest rates is smaller. To understand the difference
assume for simplicity that the nominal interest rate is fixed at iss and that the steady state is
reached after T periods such that
T−1∏
t=1
(1 + rt+1) =
T−1∏
t=1
( 1 + iss
1 + pit+1
)
=
T−1∏
t=1
(1 + iss)
PT
P1
=
T−1∏
t=1
(1 + iss)
P newss
P1
, (19)
so that the response of log(
∏T−1
t=1 (1+rt+1)) is one-to-one related to the response of log(P
new
ss )−
log(P1)). This response is quite large in complete market models (Christiano et. al. (2011))
but small here. The reason is that P newss does not respond at all and P1 falls but not that
much.
Both results are a consequence of the result that incomplete markets combined with fiscal
policy specified partially in nominal terms delivers a globally determined price level indepen-
dently of how monetary policy is specified (Hagedorn (2016)). A large drop in P1 is ruled out
as this would lead to a large increase in the real value of government debt, which requires an
increase in real interest rates (=further drop in prices) for households to be willing to absorb
the debt, and so on such that the real value of debt converges to infinity, violating households
transversality condition. The reason why P newss = Pss is that both prices solve the same asset
market clearing condition
S(1 + rss, ...) =
Bss
Pss
=
Bnewss
Pss
=
Bnewss
P newss
. (20)
Together these arguments imply that the intertemporal substitution channel is weaker in our
incomplete markets model than in the corresponding complete markets model.
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3.1.2 Distributional Consequences of a Stimulus
An increase in spending, the necessary adjustments in taxes and transfers and the resulting
responses of prices and hours operate through various distributional channels. Changes in
the tax code naturally deliver winners and losers. An increase in the price level and of labor
income leads to a redistribution from households who finance their consumption more from
asset income to households who rely more on labor income. Changes in interest rates also
redistribute between debtors and lenders.
These redistributions matter due to the endogenous heterogeneity in the MPCs in the data
and in our incomplete markets model. This heterogeneity together with the redistribution
determines the aggregate consumption response, and since output is demand determined due
to price rigidities, also determines output. Individual household consumption ct depends on
transfers T , tax rates τ , labor income wh, prices P and nominal interest rates i, so that
aggregate private consumption
Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0) = ∫ ct(a, s; {Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0)dΩt. (21)
In our model hours is a household choice variable but demand determined as well. Of course
consumption and hours worked are jointly determined in equilibrium but to understand the
demand response of the fiscal stimulus it turns out to be useful to consider wh as exogenous
for consumption decisions here. In particular it allows us to distinguish between the initial
impact,“first round”, demand impulse due to the policy change and “second, third ... round”
due to equilibrium responses. Those arise in our model since an initial policy-induced demand
stimulus leads to more employment by firms, and so higher labor income which in turn implies
more consumption demand, which again leads to more employment and so on until an equi-
librium is reached where all variables are mutually consistent. Denoting pre stimulus variables
by a bar, we can now decompose the aggregate consumption response,
(∆C)t = Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0) (22)
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into its different channels:
(∆C)t = Ct
({Tt, τt, w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Impact of Transfers and Taxes
(23)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({Tt, τt, w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Equilibrium Effect: Labor Income
(24)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0)− Ct({Tt, τt, wtht, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price and Interest rate Adjustment
(25)
Total demand is the sum of private consumption demand C and real government consumption
g = G/P , which both determine output. The private consumption response does not directly
depend on G/P but it does indirectly. First, transfers T and taxes τ have to adjust to balance
the intertemporal government budget constraint. Second, increases in G/P translate one-for-
one into increases in demand. On impact an increase by ∆g increases demand by ∆g and thus
our worked from hss to hss + ∆g. As before, this increase in labor income stimulates private
demand which in turn leads to higher employment, then again higher consumption and so
on until convergence. We therefore decompose the total demand effect ∆D of an increase in
government spending by ∆g as
(∆D)t = (∆g)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Govt’ Spending Response
+ (∆C)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Private Consumption Response
(26)
= (∆g)t + Ct
({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Impact on Private Consumption
(27)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Private Consumption Response
(28)
A fiscal stimulus, in addition to the immediate impact on government demand, also leads to
higher employment and labor income and thus stimulates private consumption, the Direct
Impact on Private Consumption. The remainder of the private consumption is as above the
sum of the direct impact of transfers and taxes, the indirect equilibrium effects of labor
income and and price and interest rate adjustment, such that the full decomposition of the
18
total demand effect ∆D is
(∆D)t = (∆g)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct G Impact
(29)
+ Ct
({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯h¯, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct G Impact on C
(30)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({T¯ , τ¯ , w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Tax/Transfer Impact
(31)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)− Ct({Tt, τt, w¯(h¯+ ∆g), P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Labor Income Impact
(32)
+ Ct
({Tt, τt, wtht, Pt, it}t≥0)− Ct({Tt, τt, wtht, P¯ , i¯}t≥0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Price and Interest Impact
(33)
3.1.3 Multiplier: Definition
As we can now be sure that the fiscal multiplier is well defined in our economy, we now follow
Farhi and Werning (2013) in computing the response of the economy to a fiscal stimulus.
Concretely, we compute the response of the economy to an unexpected increase in the
path of nominal government spending to G0, G1, G2, . . . , Gt, . . . , Gss, where Gss is the steady
nominal spending level and Gt ≥ Gss.
We summarize the effects of spending on output in several ways. First, we compute the
path of dynamic multipliers as the sequence of
mDYNt =
Yt
Yss
− 1
G0Pss
P0Gss
− 1
Yss
Gss/Pss
, (34)
and the present value multipliers as
mPVt =
∑t
k=0 β
k( Yk
Yss
− 1)∑t
k=0 β
k(GkPss
PkGss
− 1)
Yss
Gss/Pss
, (35)
where the two statistics coincide at t = 0 and represent the impact multiplier. A useful statistic
is then the long-run present value multiplier, which represents the discounted percentage
change in real output to the discounted percentage change in real government spending for
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any path of government spending:
M = mPV∞ =
∑∞
t=0 β
t( Yt
Yss
− 1)∑∞
t=0 β
t(GtPss
PtGss
− 1)
Yss
Gss/Pss
, (36)
where Pss, Gss, Yss are the steady state price level, nominal spending and real output respec-
tively and Gt
Pt
is real government spending. For comparison with the complete markets case we
also compute the as-if dynamic complete markets multiplier, mCMt , using the price path we
obtain from our model. Iterating the consumption Euler equation yields the as-if percentage
response of aggregate consumption,
Ct
Css
− 1 =
∞∏
s=t
(1 + pit+1)− 1 = P
new
ss
Pt
− 1.
Since the multiplier is in terms of units of consumption and not in percentages, adjusting for
the magnitudes of steady state consumption, output and government spending,
mCMt =
Ct−Css
Css
Css
Yss
+ Gt/Pt−Gss/Pss
Yss
G0Pss
P0Gss
− 1
Yss
Gss/Pss
=
Ct−Css
Css
G0Pss
P0Gss
− 1
Css
Gss/Pss
+
Gt/Pt −Gss/Pss
G0/P0 −Gss/Pss
=
Pnewss −Pt
Pt
G0Pss
P0Gss
− 1
Css
Gss/Pss
+
Gt/Pt −Gss/Pss
G0/P0 −Gss/Pss
3.2 Calibration
To quantitatively assess the size of the fiscal multiplier we now calibrate the model.
Preferences Households have separable preferences over labor and constant relative risk
aversion preferences for consumption. We set the risk-aversion parameter, σ, equal to 1. Fol-
lowing Krueger et al. (2016), we assume there permanent discount factor heterogeneity across
agents. We allow for two values of the discount factor, which we choose to match the Gini of
net worth net of home equity in the 2013 SCF and aggregate savings to quarterly GDP of
11.465. We assume the functional form for g:
5We calibrate to a capital to quarterly output ratio of 10.26, and government debt to quarterly GDP ratio
of 1.2.
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g(h) = ψ
h1+
1
ϕ
1 + 1
ϕ
(37)
We set the Frisch elasticity, ϕ = 0.5, following micro estimates. We choose ψ = 0.6 such that
in steady state h = 1/3.
Productivity Process We follow Krueger et al. (2016) who use data from the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics to estimate a stochastic process for labor productivity. They estimate
that log income consists of a persistent and transitory component. They estimate that the
persistent shock has an annual persistence of 0.9695 and variance of innovations of 0.0384.
The transitory shock is estimated to have variance 0.0522. We follow Krueger et al. (2016)
in converting these annual estimates into a quarterly process. We discretize the persistent
shock into a seven state Markov chain using the Rouwenhorst method and integrate over the
transitory shock using Gauss-Hertmite quadrature with three nodes.
Production Technology We set the capital share α = 0.36. We choose the quarterly
depreciation rate δ = 0.032 to generate a real return on capital net of depreciation of 0 BP
when the capital output ratio is 10.26. We asume the function form for Φ:
Φ(K ′, K) =
φk
2
(
K ′ −K
K
)2
K, (38)
and set φk = 17 to match estimates of the elasticity of investment to Tobin’s q from Eberly,
Rebelo, and Vincent (2008). We choose the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods,  = 10, to match an average markup of 10%. The adjustment cost parameter on prices,
θ = 300, to match a slope of the NK Philips curve, /θ = 0.03. We set the firm operating cost
Φ equal to the steady state markup such that steady state profits equal 0 (Basu and Fernald
(1997)). These profits are fully taxed and are distributed to households as lump-sum transfers
in the benchmark.
Government We set the proportional labor income tax, τ equal to 25%. We set nominal
government spending, G in steady state equal to 15% of output. The value of of lump-sum
transfers T is set to 8.55% of output such that roughly 40% of households receive a net transfer
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from the government (Kaplan et al., 2016).
Monetary Policy For the benchmark specification we assume that the monetary authority
operates a constant interest rate peg of i = 0. Note that the results in Hagedorn (2016) im-
ply that there is a unique response of prices, output, consumption and employment although
monetary policy is not following an active rule, a necessary requirement for a locally deter-
mined equilibrium. For purposes of comparison, we will also solve for transitions where we
assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, which sets the nominal interest rate
according to:
it+1 = max(Xt+1, 0) (39)
where
Xt+1 =
(
1
ζ
)(
Pt
Pss
)φ1(1−ρR)( Yt
Yss
)φ2(1−ρR)
[ζ(1 + it)]
ρR − 1.
We follow the literature in setting ρR = 0.8, φ1 = 1.5, φ2 = 0 and ζ = 1/(1 + rss). Fiscal
monetary coordination will be carried out under various schemes listed in the next section.
Price and Wage Philips Curves We set the slopes of both the NK price and wages Philips
curve to 0.03, which is at the lower end of available estimates.
Parameter Values
Steady State Model Fit Table II shows that we match the distribution of net worth as
well as the Gini coefficient quite well.
In the model 2% of agents have 0 wealth, and 14% of agents less than $1000. The annual
MPC out of transitory income equals 0.4, which is in the middle range of empirical estimates
0.2-0.6 (e.g. ?.) Figure 2 shows the distribution of first period MPCs as function of households
assets for transfers of various sizes, 1$, 1000$ and 10000$.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic response of aggregate consumption {Ct}t=0,1,2... to transfers
of various sizes, 1$, 1000$ and 10000$ paid once at periods 0, 4, 8 and 12.
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Table I: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Internally Calibrated Value
σ Risk-aversion N 2
β Discount Factor Y 1.3
ϕ Frisch Elasticity N 0.5
ψ Labor disutility Y 0.6
 Elas. substitution N 10
θp Price adjustment N 300
θw Wage adjustment N 300
Φ Firm Fixed Cost Y 0.1
τ Labor tax N 25%
T Transfer Y 7.5% of income
θw Wage adjustment N 300
Table II: Net Worth Distributions: Data vs Model
% Share held by: Data (SCF 07) Model
Q1 -0.2 0.3
Q2 1.2 1.3
Q3 4.6 3.4
Q4 11.9 10.3
Q5 82.5 84.7
90-95 11.1 16.7
95-99 25.3 31.1
Top 1% 33.5 18.5
Gini 0.78 0.79
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Figure 2: Propensity to consume for Transfers of Size 1$, 1000$ and 10000$.
3.3 Results
We can now compute the response of prices, employment, output and consumption to a per-
sistent increase in nominal government consumption by one percent where spending follows an
AR(1) process with parameter ρg = 0.7 after the initial innovation. Balancing the government
budget when government spending is increased requires to adjust taxes or debt or both. As
Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our model different assumptions on the path of taxes
and debt will have different implications for the path of aggregate consumption and therefore
prices and the change in output. We consider two scenarios:
1. Transfer are adjusted period by period to keep nominal debt constant.
2. Deficit financing and delayed transfers to pay back debt after 12 quarters.
For each of the two scenarios we report the dynamic response of hours, consumption,
output, prices, tax revenue and debt as well as the of the path of dynamic and static multipliers
mDt ,m
S
t and of the as-if complete markets multiplier m
CM
t and the summary multiplier M .
3.3.1 Tax Financing: Constant nominal debt
Under the first financing scheme, we assume that the government adjusts lump-sum transfers
period by period to keep the level of nominal debt constant. The four panels of Figure 5 show
the results for the aggregate consumption and output response, the different multipliers, the
decomposition of aggregate consumption, and government bonds6.
6Note: the results presented in this section are for the model without physical capital. For the lastest draft
see the authors’ website.
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Figure 3: Propensity to consume for Transfers of Size 1$, 100$ 1000$ and 10000$.
The level of government bonds is unchanged since the stimulus is tax-financed. On impact
G increases by 1% that is 0.15% of output and consumption decreases by 0.023% of output
leading to an impact multiplier of 0.847. The consumption responds weakens over time and
gets negative from period 6 onwards The dynamic multiplier converges to zero since the con-
sumption response although negative slowly dies out and becomes small relative to initial
government spending increase. The decomposition of the total consumption response reveals
the quantitative importance of the direct, the indirect and the price effects. The stimulus of
0.15% directly increases households labor supply by the same amount, leading to a aggregate
consumption response of 0.020% of output. (equation 30). The contemporaneous cut in trans-
fers lowers aggregate consumption by 0.038% on impact (equation 31) , implying a total initial
negative effect of −0.018%. This effect is negative since the government spending increases
households income proportional to their productivity and thus benefits high income house-
holds more where the transfer cut is uniformly across all income groups and thus negatively
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Figure 4: Propensity to consume for Transfers of Size 1$, 100$ 1000$ and 10000$ that are
repaid after two years.
affects high MPH households. This decrease leads to lower consumption demand, which in
turn leads to lower labor demand, lower labor income and again lower consumption demand
until an equilibrium is reached. These indirect multiplier effects sum up to −0.005% (equation
32) further lowering the consumption response. Finally, the decomposition shows that the
price increase (and the unchanged interest rate) effects are small (equation 33).
The impulse response of the remaining variables to a 1% innovation in government spending
are plotted in Figure A-1 in the appendix. The cumulated multiplier, reported in Table III, is
only 0.63.
3.3.2 Deficit financing
Under this scenario we assume that real transfers are kept constant during the first 20 quarters
after the innovation to government spending. Then, the government is assumed to adjust
transfers linearly over eight quarters, keep them constant for eight quarters, and then allow
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Figure 5: Fiscal Multiplier and Aggregate Consumption: Tax Financing
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transfers to revert back to the real steady state level with an autocorrelation parameter of
0.8. Thus, under this timing scheme, the government chooses only the level of adjustment to
transfers to guarantee that nominal government debt returns to its original level.
The four panels of Figure 6 summarize the main results for the aggregate consumption
and output response, different multipliers, the decomposition of aggregate consumption, and
government bonds.
Deficit instead of tax financing increases the initial multiplier from 0.847 to 1.156 and the
initial aggregate consumption response from −0.023% to 0.024%. The decomposition of the
consumption responds makes clear why. The direct impact of the spending stimulus is basically
identical (0.020%) but now there is no initial offsetting effect from contemporaneously higher
taxes. The total initial effect thus equals 0.0197 (−0.018% before), almost identical to the
direct spending impact, leading to a larger increase in labor demand and households income.
The indirect multiplier effects now accumulate to 0.003% The deficit financing leads to an
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Figure 6: Fiscal Multiplier and Aggregate Consumption: Deficit Financing
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increase in government bonds and the consumption response becomes negative only from
period 9 onwards. However, the increase in government spending is ultimately financed through
a future reduction in transfers, which results in a contraction in future output. Thus, despite
the cumulated discounted multiplier is 1.081, slightly smaller than the impact multiplier. The
impulse responses of the remaining variables are plotted in Figure A-2 in the appendix.
3.4 Further Analysis
We now extend the analysis in various directions. First we investigate in Section 3.4.1 how
the size of the fiscal multiplier depends on the MPC by considering identical economies but
with lower MPCs due to relaxed credit constraints. We then use a Taylor interest rate rule to
describe monetary policy instead of a nominal interest rate fixed at the ZLB in Section 3.4.2.
We then ask how the size of the fiscal multiplier depends on the timing of spending (“forward
spending”) and on the persistence of the stimulus in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. So far we have
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Table III: Cumulated Multiplier M
Tax Financing Deficit Financing
0.63 1.08
focused - as does the literature - on the effects of an increase in government spending. Another
stimulus policy is to increase transfers and we consider such policies in Section 3.4.5. Finally,
we consider spending and transfer policies in a liquidity trap in Sections 3.4.6, 3.4.7 and 3.4.8.
We also investigate how the size of the multiplier depends on the scale of the stimulus and on
the degree of price and wage rigidities.
3.4.1 Different MPCs
Here we consider in more detail how the fiscal multiplier depends on the MPC. In our bench-
mark analysis the annual aggregate MPC equals 0.4. We now redo the experiments from the
previous Section but with lower MPCs. To obtain lower MPPs we loosen households credit
constraints. In the benchmark households constraint is zero, that is they cannot obtain any
credit. We now consider credit constraints xxx including the natural borrowing limit which
implies annual aggregate MPCs of xxx.
The four panel in Figure xxx show the results for the aggregate consumption response and
its components and the fiscal multiplier for all the MPCs we consider. For each MPC we have
one Figure which includes consumption, its components and the multiplier which is just the
sum of the aggregate consumption response and the increase in government expenditures
We find ...
3.4.2 Taylor Rule
We find similar results if instead of an interest rate peg, the monetary authority follows a
Taylor rule. This is not surprising since the prices respond only very little when the interest is
pegged at zero. The four panels of Figure 6 summarize the main results. The impulse response
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Figure 7: Fiscal Multiplier and Aggregate Consumption: Taylor Rule and Deficit Financing
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are plotted in Figure A-3.The same conclusion is reached for tax instead of deficit financing
as the impulse responses in Figure A-4 show.
3.4.3 Forward Spending
The multiplier gets smaller if the spending is pre-announced to occur at a future date, 8
quarters from now. The additional spending is deficit financed. The price level now increases
gradually in anticipation of the future increase in government spending such that Initially
output falls before it increases at the time of the spending increase 8 quarters in the future.
However, the increase in consumption as well as the multiplier at that time are smaller than
the corresponding multiplier in the case when the stimulus occurs immediately and is deficit
financed. The impulse responses to a spending increase 8 quarters in the future are plotted in
Figure A-6 in the appendix.
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Figure 8: Future (+8 quarters) spending: Deficit Financing
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3.4.4 More Persistent Spending
We now again compute the response of prices, employment, output and consumption to a
persistent increase in nominal government consumption by one percent where spending follows
an AR(1) process but now with a higher persistence parameter ρg = 0.9 > 0.7. Figure A-7
in the appendix shows the impulse responses and Figure 9 the dynamic and the cumulative
multiplier for various degrees of persistence
3.4.5 Transfer Multiplier
In this section we consider the multiplier in response to a one percent increase in government
transfers. We assume that nominal government spending adjusts to keep real government
spending constant in response to the innovation in transfers. We allow the government to
finance the increase in transfers by first increasing government debt, but by increasing future
transfers as in the previous section to pay back the debt.
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Figure 9: Multipliers: Persistence ρG of spending
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The impulse response is plotted in Figure A-5. The impulse response is qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to the impulse response to an increase in government spending with
delayed repayment. Output rises more, however, when transfers increase than when spending
increases. This can be understood because, in addition to an increase in spending coming
from an increase in the price level and a decline in the real rate, the heterogeneity in marginal
propensities to consume means that some households will increase their spending by even more
than would be implied from the fall in the real rate in a representative agent model. However,
the cumulative multiplier ends up being around -0.1. As the future decrease in transfers needed
to return nominal government debt to its steady state level are sufficiently contractionary to
offset the contemporaneous gains.
Figure 10 shows the results.
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Table IV: Main Results Consumption and Multipliers
Baseline Taylor Rule Forward Transfer
Tax-Finance Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Impact Mult. 0.8473 1.156 1.085 0.408
Cumul 0.6315 1.081 0.841 3.626
∆C0 -0.0230 0.024 0.013 0.020 0.031
Decomposition of Consumption
Direct G on C 0.0197 0.020 0.020 0.012 0
Tax/Transfers -0.0375 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.024
Indirect Income -0.0054 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.008
Prices 0.0002 0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.001
Note - The table contains the impact and the cumulated multiplier M as well as the initial consumption response
∆C0. The last four rows show the decomposition of the initial aggregate consumption response into the direct
G impact on C (equation 30), the effect of taxes/transfers (equation 31), indirect income effects (equation 32)
and the price and interest rate effects (equation 33).
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Figure 10: Transfer Multipliers (Deficit Financed)
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3.4.6 Liquidity Trap
In this section we explore the extent to which the size of the multiplier may vary with other
shocks hitting the economy. In particular, we consider what the government multiplier is after
a demand shock. We therefore first have to generate a liquidity trap in the model, where the
ZLB on nominal interest rates is binding. In doing so we follow Cochrane (2015) and construct
a series of discount factors {βt}(t=1,2,...) such that the natural real rate of interest - the real
interest interest rate in a world with flexible prices and wages - equals −2% for 5 years and
then returns to zero afterwards. All other parameters are unchanged.
We then feed the series of discount factors {βt}(t=1,2,...) into our model with price and
wage rigidities and calculate the response of the economy, which is shown in Figure 11. The
resulting recession is quite large as output initially drops by about 5 percent. We solve for
the impulse response to the demand shock under two scenarios previously considered, one -
tax financing - where real government debt is kept constant and the other - deficit financing
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- where we adjust transfers in the future to return back to steady state nominal debt.
Under these two scenarios, we also compute the effect of a simultaneous (at the same
time as the liquidity trap starts) 1% increase in nominal government spending. Thus, we can
compute the fiscal multiplier as the percent increase in output under this scenario, relative
to the benchmark with no increase in spending, divided by the relative percent differences in
government spending. The multipliers are plotted in the left panel of Figure 12. The right panel
of Figure 12 shows the transfer multiplier, where again only deficit financing is meaningful.
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Figure 11: Economy in a Liquidity Trap
3.4.7 Scale Effects
We consider the size of the multiplier in the liquidity trap described above and how it depends
on the scale of the government spending and transfer stimulus. The left panel of Figure 13
shows the government spending multiplier for a 1%, 2%, 5%, 10% increase. The right panel of
Figure 13 shows the same for the transfer multiplier again for 1%, 2%, 5%, 10% increases.
35
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
(%
)
Consumption
Private
Total (Output)
0 5 10 15
Quarters
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Multipliers
Dyn.
CM
10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Private C Decomposition
Total
Direct G impact on C
Indirect Tax/Transfer
Indirect Labor Inc.
Indirect Price/Interest
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-2
-1
0
1
2
(%
)
Fiscal Policy
Real Gov Spending
Real Transfers
Nominal Bonds
(a) Spending Multiplier (Tax Financed)
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
(%
)
Consumption
Private
Total (Output)
0 5 10 15
Quarters
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Multipliers
Dyn.
CM
10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Private C Decomposition
Total
Direct G impact on C
Indirect Tax/Transfer
Indirect Labor Inc.
Indirect Price/Interest
0 10 20 30 40
Quarters
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
(%
)
Fiscal Policy
Real Gov Spending
Real Transfers
Nominal Bonds
(b) Spending Multiplier (Deficit Financed) r
Figure 12: Fiscal Multipliers in a Liquidity Trap
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Figure 13: Multiplier in a Liquidity Trap and Scale of Spending/Transfers (Deficit Financing)
3.4.8 The degree of price and wage rigidities
Show liquidity trap multiplier for various degrees of price and wage rigidities. The left panel
of Figure 14 shows the government spending multiplier for various degrees of price rigidities,
including fully flexible prices. The right panel of Figure 14 shows the same for wage rigidities.
4 Conclusions
[TO BE COMPLETED]
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Figure 14: Multiplier in a Liquidity Trap and Degree of Rigidities
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I Figures
I.1 Impulse Responses: Main Results (Section 3.3)
Figure A-1: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government spending: Tax Fi-
nancing (Constant Nominal Debt).
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Figure A-2: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government spending: Deficit
Financing
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I.2 Impulse Responses: Taylor Rule
Figure A-3: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government spending: Deficit
Financing, Taylor Rule
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Figure A-4: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government spending: Tax Fi-
nancing, Taylor Rule
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I.3 Impulse Responses: Transfer Multiplier
Figure A-5: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government Transfers: Deficit
Financing
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I.4 Impulse Responses: Forward Spending
Figure A-6: Impulse response to a future (+8 quarters) 1% increase in nominal government
spending: Deficit Financing
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I.5 Impulse Responses: Higher persistence
Figure A-7: Impulse response to a 1% increase in nominal government spending (Persistence
0.9) ): Deficit Financing
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II Derivations and Proofs
II.1 Derivation Pricing Equation
The firm’s pricing problem is
Vt (pjt−1) ≡ max
pjt
pjt
Pt
y (pjt;Pt, Yt)−wt(y(pjt;Pt, Yt)
Zt
)
1
1−α− θ
2
(
pjt
pjt−1
− Π
)2
Yt+
1
1 + rt
Vt+1 (pjt) ,
subject to the constraints njt = (
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Zt
)
1
1−α and y(pjt;Pt, Yt) =
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt.
Equivalently
Vt (pjt−1) ≡ max
pjt
pjt
Pt
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt−wt(
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Zt
)
1
1−α − θ
2
(
pjt
pjt−1
− Π
)2
Yt +
1
1 + rt
Vt+1 (pjt) ,
The FOC w.r.t pjt
(1− )
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt
+

1− αwt
(
pjt
Pt
)− 
1−α−1 ( Yt
ZtPt
) 1
1−α − θ
(
pjt
pjt−1
− Π
)
Yt
pjt−1
+
1
1 + rt
V ′t+1(pjt) = 0
(A1)
and the envelope condition
V ′t+1 = θ
(
pjt+1
pjt
− Π
)
pjt+1
pjt
Yt+1
pjt
. (A2)
Combining the FOC and and the envelope condition
(1− )
(
pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt
+

1− αwt
(
pjt
Pt
)− 
1−α−1 ( Yt
ZtPt
) 1
1−α
− θ
(
pjt
pjt−1
− Π
)
Yt
pjt−1
+
1
1 + rt
θ
(
pjt+1
pjt
− Π
)
pjt+1
pjt
Yt+1
pjt
= 0 (A3)
Using that all firms choose the same price in equilibrium
(1− ) + 
1− αwtZ
1
α−1
t
(Yt
Pt
) α
1−α
− θ (pit − Π) pit + 1
1 + rt
θ
(
pit+1 − Π
)
pit+1
Yt+1
Yt
= 0 (A4)
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II.2 Derivation Wage Equation
Θ (sjt,Wjt,Wjt−1;Yt) = sjt
θw
2
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)2
Ht.
The middleman’s wage setting problem is to maximize
V wt
(
Wˆt−1
)
≡ max
Wˆt
∫ (sjt(1− τt)Wˆt
Pt
h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht)− sjtg(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht))dj −
∫
sjt
θw
2
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)2
Htdj
+
1
1 + rt
V wt+1
(
Wˆt
)
, (A5)
where hjt = h(Wjt;Wt, Ht) =
(
Wjt
Wt
)−w
Ht.
The FOC w.r.t Wˆt
(1− τt)(1− w)
(
Wˆt
Wt
)−w
Ht
Pt
+ wg
′(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht))
(
Wˆt
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)−w−1
Ht
Wt
(A6)
−θw
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)
Ht
Wˆt−1
+
1
1 + rt
V ′t+1(Wˆt) = 0
(A7)
and the envelope condition
V ′t+1 = θw
(
Wˆt+1
Wˆt
− Πw
)
Wˆt+1
Wˆt
Ht+1
Wˆt
, (A8)
where we have used that
∫
s = 1.
Combining the FOC and and the envelope condition
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Using that Wˆt = Wt, pi
w
t =
Wt
Wt−1
= Wˆt
Wˆt−1
and hjt = Ht:
(1− τt)(1− w)Wt
Pt
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piwt − Πw
)
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1
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III GHH Preferences
In this Section of the appendix we explore the multiplier for different preferences. We assume
that households have identical GHH preferences for leisure nested within constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences for non-durable consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht, st)
where:
u(c, h) =

(c−stg(ht))1−σ−1
1−σ if σ 6= 1
log(c− stg(ht)) if σ = 1.
Except for the wage setting all model parts remain unchanged. The middleman’s wage setting
problem is slightly changed to
V wt
(
Wˆt−1
)
≡ max
Wˆt
∫ (sjt(1− τt)Wˆt
Pt
h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht)− sjtg(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht))dj −
∫
sjt
θw
2
(
Wˆt
Wˆt−1
− Πw
)2
Htdj.
+
1
1 + rt
V wt+1
(
Wˆt
)
, (A11)
and the wage inflation equation becomes
θw
(
piwt − Πw
)
piwt = (1− τt)(1− w)wt+ wg′(h(Wˆt;Wt, Ht)) +
1
1 + rt
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..
(A12)
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